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 Jeff rey R.  Dichter ,  MD ;  Robert K.  Kanter ,  MD ;  David  Dries ,  MD ;  Valerie  Luyckx ,  MD ;  Matthew L.  Lim ,  MD ;  
John  Wilgis ,  MD ;  Michael R.  Anderson ,  MD, MBA ;  Babak  Sarani ,  MD ;  Nathaniel  Hupert ,  MD ;  Ryan  Mutter ,  MD ;  
Asha V.  Devereaux ,  MD, MPH, FCCP ;  Michael D.  Christian ,  MD, FRCPC, FCCP ;  and  Niranjan  Kissoon ,  MBBS, FRCPC ; 
 on behalf of the Task Force for Mass Critical Care 
 BACKGROUND:  System-level planning involves uniting hospitals and health systems, local/regional 
government agencies, emergency medical services, and other health-care entities involved in 
coordinating and enabling care in a major disaster. We reviewed the literature and sought 
expert opinions concerning system-level planning and engagement for mass critical care due 
to disasters or pandemics and off er suggestions for system-planning, coordination, commu-
nication, and response. Th e suggestions in this chapter are important for all of those involved 
in a pandemic or disaster with multiple critically ill or injured patients, including front-line 
clinicians, hospital administrators, and public health or government offi  cials. 
 METHODS:  Th e American College of Chest Physicians (CHEST) consensus statement devel-
opment process was followed in developing suggestions. Task Force members met in person 
to develop nine key questions believed to be most relevant for system-planning, coordina-
tion, and communication. A systematic literature review was then performed for relevant 
articles and documents, reports, and other publications reported since 1993. No studies of 
suffi  cient quality were identifi ed upon which to make evidence-based recommendations. 
Th erefore, the panel developed expert opinion-based suggestions using a modifi ed Delphi 
process. 
 RESULTS:  Suggestions were developed and grouped according to the following thematic ele-
ments: (1) national government support of health-care coalitions/regional health authorities 
(HC/RHAs), (2) teamwork within HC/RHAs, (3) system-level communication, (4) system-level 
surge capacity and capability, (5) pediatric patients and special populations, (6) HC/RHAs 
and networks, (7) models of advanced regional care systems, and (8) the use of simulation for 
preparedness and planning. 
 CONCLUSIONS:  System-level planning is essential to provide care for large numbers of criti-
cally ill patients because of disaster or pandemic. It also entails a departure from the routine, 
independent system and involves all levels from health-care institutions to regional health 
authorities. National government support is critical, as are robust communication systems and 
advanced planning supported by realistic exercises. 
  CHEST 2014;  146 ( 4_Suppl ): e87S - e102S 
 ABBREVIATIONS :  HC/RHA 5  health-care coalition/regional health authority 
 [   Evidence-Based Medicine    ] 
Downloaded From: http://journal.publications.chestnet.org/ by a Columbia University User  on 10/21/2014
e88S Evidence-Based Medicine [  1 4 6 # 4  C H E S T  O C TO B E R  2 0 1 4  S U P P L E M E N T  ] 
 Summary of Suggestions 
 National Government Support of Health-care 
Coalitions/Regional Health Authorities—Policy 
 1a. We suggest political leadership at national 
levels should support health-care preparedness 
through financial assistance, support of market 
driven incentives, and preparedness requirements to 
health-care coalitions/regional health authorities 
(HC/RHAs). 
 1b. We suggest national governments should 
support the development of responsive and nimble 
disaster/pan demic research processes that can both 
organize and assess information from prior disas-
ters/pandemics, acquire real-time data in an ongoing 
one to provide situational awareness, and which can 
also learn from and support international disaster 
relief eff orts. 
 1c. We suggest national, state/province/regional, and 
city/district governments should: 
 •  Working with health-care experts and leadership, 
develop formal legal disaster/pandemic activation 
mechanisms to initiate, implement, and support 
disaster/pandemic plans and standards of care for 
HC/RHAs and healthcare professionals; and legally 
initiate step down termination procedures and pro-
cesses as conditions and criteria warrant in the 
recovery phase 
 •  Work with health-care experts and leadership in the 
greater health-care community to develop and refi ne 
specifi c “trigger” criteria for formal legal activation 
and step down termination procedures and pro-
cesses of disaster/pandemic plans and standards 
of care. 
 1d. We suggest local governments and government 
agencies should be formal partners in their local 
health-care coalition(s), and be actively engaged 
with their ongoing preparedness and response 
activities. 
 Teamwork Within HC/RHAs—Foundational 
Principles 
 2. We suggest health-care coalition partners should 
work together, with the following objectives: 
 2a. HC/RHA clinical and administrative leaders from 
all partners meet together on a routine, scheduled 
basis. Clinician leaders must include critical care 
medicine experts. 
 2b. HC/RHA clinical and administrative leaders from 
all partners work together at least yearly with primary 
focus on developing and updating joint disaster/pan-
demic preparedness plans based on likely events 
(Hazard Vulnerability Analyses). 
 2c. HC/RHA clinical and administrative leaders from 
all partners jointly practice activation and implemen-
tation of disaster/pandemic plans and standards of 
care through exercises. 
 2d. HC/RHA partners activate their communication 
and collaboration mechanisms for virtually all actual 
or potential surge events, or unusual or large scale 
planned or unplanned events requiring cooperation, 
to ensure optimal responses and enable experience 
working together. 
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 2e. HC/RHAs identify clinical experts to oversee and 
address the needs of specifi c populations, especially 
pediatrics, and also specialty populations such as 
trauma, burns, oncologic, etc. 
 2f. HC/RHA clinical and administrative leadership 
should be defi ned by position, not specifi c personnel, 
consistent with Incident Command System (ICS) 
nomenclature or equivalent, and designed with 
appropriate redundancy. 
 System-Level Communication—Foundational 
Principles 
 3a. We suggest HC/RHAs should have secure online 
and/or published directories for all partners’ clinical 
and administrative leadership, with emergency 
contact information (phone numbers, e-mail 
addresses, pagers, cell phone texting preferences, 
other means) and current call schedules. 
 3b. We suggest HC/RHA’s should have defined 
communication vehicles which may include (but 
are not limited to): dedicated secure health-care 
coalition web sites; conference call lines and 
teleconferencing technologies (eg, Skype, others); 
hospital phones (land lines and cell phones); 
pagers, hand-held walkie-talkies, ham radios, or 
other similar means of communication; telemedicine 
technologies, such as E-ICU, integrated into their 
disaster plans. 
 3c. We suggest HC/RHA partners should attempt to 
routinely use those agreed upon communication 
vehicles when working together. 
 3d. We suggest all agreed upon communication 
vehicles should be tested on a scheduled basis, with 
objective criteria to validate the test. 
 3e. We suggest the choice of communication vehicles 
and testing may be based on likely disaster/pandemic 
events (Hazard Vulnerability Analyses), and/or other 
appropriate considerations. 
 3f. We suggest developing defined disaster/pan-
demic plans for monitoring and leveraging 
popular social media (eg, Twitter, Facebook, 
others) during all actual or potential surge events, 
or unusual or large scale planned or unplanned 
events requiring cooperation, as both a means 
for gathering and transmitting information, as 
appropriate. 
 3g. We suggest HC/RHAs should have defi ned 
communication tools designated for each level of 
organizational leadership, which should be consistent 
with ICS structure or equivalent. 
 System-Level Surge Capacity and Capability 
 4a. We suggest HC/RHA surge objectives should be 
consistent with individual hospital surge goals and 
include the capability to surge to: 
 •  Up to 200% above routine maximal capacity based 
on the nature and severity of the disaster (contin-
gency to crisis) 
 •  Up to the limit of the total number of ventilators 
available to coalition partners. 
 •  Up to projected patient loads in a slow onset, slow 
evolving disaster. 
 4b. We suggest HC/RHAs should be able to monitor 
and track their defi ned surge capacity supplies and 
equipment, ideally “real time” and electronically, with 
the intent of being able to use all HC/RHA assets. 
Th ese supplies and equipment may include identifi ed 
caches of important medications or equipment, and 
bed availability among partners. 
 4c. We suggest HC/RHAs should have the ability 
to track the number of available ICU capable 
personnel (“force multipliers”) and other desig-
nated specialist “resources” (eg, pediatric and 
special populations) through their partner hospi-
tals. Partners with telemedicine capability (such 
as tele-ICU’s) should have plans for how to use 
this resource to optimize the use of pediatric and 
specialty expertise across hospitals served by the 
telemedicine resource. 
 4d. We suggest HC/RHAs should have defi ned 
policies and procedures for emergency privileging 
for all health-care professionals designated as 
coalition resources. 
 4e. We suggest fair and adequate reimbursement for 
expenditures and loss of revenue related to delivery 
of acute critical care services during a disaster or 
pandemic must be ensured. Th is should include the 
guarantee of payments from governmental sources, as 
well as by insurance companies and other payers of 
health-care services. 
 Pediatric Patients and Specialty Populations 
 5a. We suggest HC/RHAs have identified, 
and be familiar with, the following pediatric 
disaster/pan demic designated resources including, 
but not limited to: 
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 •  Pediatric consultative specialists available by dedi-
cated phone line support and/or dedicated video or 
telemedicine consultation. 
 •  Designated pediatric surge personnel (eg, pediatric 
hospitalists, others) available to non-pediatric hos-
pitals and health systems to support surge in con-
tingency or crisis level events, with a defi ned plan 
for how to activate this resource when needed. 
 •  Identifi ed pediatric capable transport resources 
for allocation and matching of pediatric patients 
to available HC/RHA pediatric resources. 
 •  Knowledge of available key supplies, medications, 
and other pediatric assets; location of these assets 
with a defi ned process for how they may be accessed 
urgently; and ability to monitor when asset reserves 
fall below a defi ned critical threshold. 
 •  Pediatric educational resources. If web-based, they 
should be found on HC/RHA websites, or with links 
to appropriate resources. If published, resources 
should be readily available to all partners. 
 5b. We suggest HC/RHAs should have plans to 
provide care for specialty populations routinely found 
in their catchment area or region in parallel as 
described for pediatrics. Resources should include 
consultative services, potential surge personnel, 
transport resources, specialty supplies/medications, 
and educational resources. Th ese populations include 
but are not limited to trauma, nephrology, burns, 
oncologic patients. 
 5c. Health-care coalitions, health systems, and hospitals 
identify patients with high-level chronic disease care 
needs, such as a home ventilator, home oxygen, 
chronic dialysis, and work to ensure their needs are 
met at home to help prevent these patients from 
having to seek assistance at hospitals. 
 HC/RHAs and Networks 
 6a. We suggest during a disaster requiring transfer of 
patients, whether from emergency medicine depart-
ments or inpatient areas, transferring partners may 
have initial choice of where patients are referred based 
on traditional referral patterns. However, HC/RHA 
leadership must oversee this process, and be able to 
intercede as both a resource and with the authority to 
redirect transfers based on anticipated or actual 
events. Defi ned health-care coalition coordination 
processes and transfer resources should be planned 
and identifi ed ahead of time. 
 6b. Health-care coalitions should designate neigh-
boring health-care coalitions as potential partners 
during a contingency or crisis event, and have readily 
available leadership contact information, and knowl-
edge of these potential partners’ size and capabilities. 
 Models of Advanced Regional Care Systems 
 7. Advanced Regional Care Systems instituted within 
large hospitals, and across hospitals, health systems 
and HC/RHAs, will have the greatest chance for success 
if they are established with the following goals: 
 •  Clear and transparent objectives for what those 
programs are to accomplish, and the programs are 
well integrated and accepted across their hospital 
and health system partners. 
 •  Have administrative and fi nancial resources suffi  -
cient to support the objectives desired 
 •  Are evaluated based on objective outcome measures 
and best-practice process indicators, and strive for 
consistent data defi nitions and goals, which facili-
tate outcome comparison with other systems. 
 •  Are driven by an impassioned performance improve-
ment culture. 
 •  Have eff ective communication systems and processes 
across their hospitals, health systems, and health-
care coalitions/regional health authority part-
ners, between potential pre- and post- hospital 
partners, and with patients and families. 
 •  Develop clear expectations and supportive clin-
ical and educational resources for patients and 
their families, especially those patients with chronic 
medical illnesses. 
 The Use of Simulation for Preparedness and 
Planning 
 8. We suggest hospitals, health systems, and HC/RHAs 
promote the use of computer modeling to gain insight 
into their operational capabilities and limitations, in 
the following ways: 
 •  Support the creation of computer models utilizing 
industry templates in collaboration with their 
own administrative, clinical, and technical resource 
experts from participating system partners. Models 
should include government and military resources 
when applicable, and include provision of mainte-
nance of chronically ill patient populations. 
 •  Collaborate with modelers in the design, imple-
mentation, and testing of these models; and with 
the interpretation and application of these 
results. 
 •  Support the data requirements for such system 
models, and develop repositories for operationally 
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relevant data that can be used in future modeling 
eff orts. 
 •  Leverage their relationships with national, 
regional, and local governments and public health 
agencies and emergency medical service providers 
to obtain necessary data on the transportation 
and patient logistic components of such models 
as required. 
 Introduction 
 System-level planning is focused on health-care 
delivery that unites all local health-care organizations, 
including hospitals, health systems, local/regional 
government agencies, emergency medical services, and 
virtually all other health-care entities that may be called 
on to deliver care in a major disaster or pandemic. In 
the United States, this is identifi ed as a health-care 
coalition (sometimes referred to as a tier 2 or Multi-
agency Coordination System)  1 - 3  and internationally 
referenced in this publication as a regional health 
authority (RHA). 
 Although community-based health-care coalition/RHAs 
(HC/RHAs) may not have specifi c operational authority 
and thus not be considered a response organization, in 
collaboration with emergency management and other 
government partners, an HC/RHA can cooperatively 
support medical surge planning and response through 
information sharing and resource coordination.  1 , 2 , 4 , 5  
Specific hospital accreditation requirements may also 
defi ne a hospital’s role in a community-based emer-
gency medical system.  6  
 HC/RHA partners may not routinely work together and 
may even be competitors but usually will cooperate 
during a disaster/pandemic. Th e power of their eff ec-
tiveness relies on teamwork. Th us, the task force chose 
to address system-level planning with the intent to 
develop suggestions to facilitate teamwork among 
HC/RHAs in conjunction with their government 
partners to highlight the necessary infrastructure to 
provide eff ective mass critical care. 
 Government support, teamwork, and system-level 
communication are basic infrastructure for HC/RHAs, 
and because of their importance, elements of these three 
principles are briefl y reviewed early in this document. 
Eff ective teamwork is the foundation for increasing 
HC/RHA success in all endeavors. Finally, we off er 
suggestions developed from examples of currently 
eff ective advanced regional care systems and simulation 
models such that that these may off er insight to base 
future system-level design. 
 Th e suggestions in this chapter are important for all of 
those involved in a disaster or pandemic with multiple 
critically ill patients, including front-line clinicians, hospital 
administrators, and public health or government 
offi  cials. Although it is important for all providers to be 
familiar with the system requirements of disaster and 
pandemic response,  Table 1 provides an overview of the 
suggestions most of interest to each of the above groups. 
 Materials and Methods 
 The Systems Planning panel followed the American College of Chest 
Physicians (CHEST) Guidelines Oversight Committee’s methodology 
to develop suggestions, based on a consensus development process 
(see “Methodology” article by Ornelas et al  7  in this consensus state-
ment). Th e Systems Planning panel developed nine key questions (see 
 e - Appendix  1 for key questions list and corresponding search terms and 
results). A systematic literature review was then performed for relevant 
articles and documents, reports, and other publications reported since 
1993 to 2012; English-language papers were included, and non-English-
language papers were excluded. No studies of suffi  cient quality were 
identifi ed upon which to make evidence-based recommendations. Th ere-
fore, the panel developed expert-opinion-based suggestions utilizing a 
modifi ed Delphi process. 
 Results 
 National Government Support of HC/RHAs—Policy 
 1a. We suggest political leadership at national levels 
should support health-care preparedness through 
fi nancial assistance, support of market driven incen-
tives, and preparedness requirements to HC/RHAs. 
 1b. We suggest national governments should 
support the development of responsive and nimble 
disaster/pan demic research processes that can both 
organize and assess information from prior disas-
ters/pandemics, acquire real-time data in an ongoing 
one to provide situational awareness, and which can 
also learn from and support international disaster 
relief eff orts. 
 1c. We suggest national, state/province/regional, and 
city/district governments should: 
 •  Working with health-care experts and leadership, 
develop formal legal disaster/pandemic activation 
mechanisms to initiate, implement, and support 
disaster/pandemic plans and standards of care for 
health-care coalitions/regional health authorities 
and health-care professionals; and legally initiate 
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step down termination procedures and processes as 
conditions and criteria warrant in the recovery phase 
 •  Work with health-care experts and leadership in the 
greater health-care community to develop and refi ne 
specifi c “trigger” criteria for formal legal activation 
and step down termination procedures and processes 
of disaster/pandemic plans and standards of care. 
 1d. We suggest local governments and government 
agencies should be formal partners in their local 
health-care coalition(s), and be actively engaged 
with their ongoing preparedness and response 
activities. 
 Since 2002, health-care coalitions in the United States 
have developed because of fi nancial support and 
leadership from the federal government.  4 , 8  Success in 
disaster preparedness relies on this level of leadership 
and coordination. National governments should 
fi nancially support HC/RHAs with market-led incentives 
when appropriate and guide establishment of national 
standards for preparedness and response ( Fig 1 ). 
 Active government participation in health-care coali-
tions in the United States ensures integration with local 
public health authorities, emergency medical services, 
and health-care providers such as nursing and mental 
health facilities, which have previously been omitted 
from the emergency preparedness community.  4 , 8  
Government-health care partnerships are an important 
component of both preparedness and successful 
response capabilities.  9  Th ese partnerships are important 
because HC/RHAs are vulnerable to disruptions of 
normal patient care during virtually any disaster, 
leading to potential mismatch of need and resources.  5 , 10  
Although dedicated resources for developing triggers 
for implementing and terminating crisis standards of 
care are available, the work of developing them is a 
responsibility of local health-care and government 
leadership.  11 , 12  Government leadership, in collaboration 
with health-care experts, is needed to defi ne specifi c 
criteria for activation of emergency response plans, 
including when “crisis standards of care” are invoked 
and when they are terminated, and provide guidance 
for providers and health-care systems  10  (see “Legal 
Preparedness” article by Courtney et al  13  in this 
consensus statement). 
 Th ere is little scientifi c evidence to guide disaster 
preparation and practice. During the 2009 infl uenza 
A(H1N1) pandemic, insuffi  cient research infrastructure 
to initiate clinical studies meant vital questions 
remained unanswered. Similar gaps have been noted in 
other disasters, indicating the importance of public 
health emergency response research.  14 - 16  We suggest 
national governments support the creation of a clinical 
research infrastructure, including predeveloped proto-
cols, data collection instruments, ethical oversight, and 
funding to conduct necessary research during acute 
public health emergencies.  16  
 Teamwork Within HC/RHAs—Foundational 
Principles 
 2. We suggest health-care coalition partners should 
work together, with the following objectives: 
  
 Figure 1 –  National governments and suggestions for support of disaster 
preparedness (top three boxes) and suggestions for continuing to work 
with local governments and health-care coalition/regional health 
authorities to facilitate preparedness planning (bottom two boxes). 
 TABLE 1 ]  List of Suggestions, With Recommended 
Category of Health-care Professionals 
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 2a. HC/RHA clinical and administrative leaders from 
all partners meet together on a routine, scheduled 
basis. Clinician leaders must include critical care 
medicine experts. 
 2b. HC/RHA clinical and administrative leaders 
from all partners work together at least yearly with 
primary focus on developing and updating joint 
disaster/pan demic preparedness plans based on likely 
events (Hazard Vulnerability Analyses). 
 2c. HC/RHA clinical and administrative leaders from 
all partners jointly practice activation and implemen-
tation of disaster/pandemic plans and standards of 
care through exercises. 
 2d. HC/RHA partners activate their communication 
and collaboration mechanisms for virtually all actual 
or potential surge events, or unusual or large scale 
planned or unplanned events requiring cooperation, 
to ensure optimal responses and enable experience 
working together. 
 2e. HC/RHAs identify clinical experts to oversee and 
address the needs of specifi c populations, especially 
pediatrics, and also specialty populations such as 
trauma, burns, oncologic, etc. 
 2f. HC/RHA clinical and administrative leadership 
should be defi ned by position, not specifi c personnel, 
consistent with Incident Command System (ICS) 
nomenclature or equivalent, and designed with 
appropriate redundancy. 
 Eff ective teamwork among all partners is critical for 
optimal performance of the HC/RHAs in preparedness 
and response activities.  1 , 4 , 5 , 8  As evidenced during 
Hurricane Sandy,  16  the foundation of any team is 
personal relationships and the development of trust 
through common work toward mutual goals.  17  
Although smaller in scale, trauma networks and 
telemedicine systems are associated with improved 
outcomes through regional coordination, with consen-
sus recommendations supporting similar systems for 
acute coronary syndromes and stroke.  17 - 20  Administra-
tive and clinical leaders meeting, working, and per-
forming disaster exercises together on a routine, 
scheduled basis serve to create eff ective teams through 
professional and social interactions. Meeting annually 
is believed to be the minimum required to develop 
eff ective relationships. 
 Intensivist expertise in planning and response is also 
important in pandemics and disasters.  21 , 22  Th erefore, 
a critical care physician’s expertise should be part of 
a HC/RHA’s leadership planning and operational 
structure to aid in patient triage and transfer; help 
prevent undertriage and overtriage; help coordinate 
resources and information; serve forward medical 
response teams (through the National Disaster Medical 
System or equivalent organizations); and provide a 
level of portable critical care that can assist local 
providers and coalitions with inpatient triage, treat-
ment, and transport  5 , 21  (see “Surge Capacity Principles” 
article by Hick et al,  23  “Surge Capacity Logistics” article 
by Einav et al,  24  and “Evacuation of the ICU” article by 
King et al  25  in this consensus statement). 
 System-Level Communication—Foundational 
Principles 
 3a. We suggest HC/RHAs should have secure online 
and/or published directories for all partners’ clinical 
and administrative leadership, with emergency 
contact information (phone numbers, e-mail addresses, 
pagers, cell phone texting preferences, other means) 
and current call schedules. 
 3b. We suggest HC/RHA’s should have defi ned 
communication vehicles which may include (but are 
not limited to): dedicated secure health-care coalition 
web sites; conference call lines and teleconferencing 
technologies (eg, Skype, others); hospital phones 
(land lines and cell phones); pagers, hand-held 
walkie-talkies, ham radios, or other similar means of 
communication; telemedicine technologies, such as 
E-ICU, integrated into their disaster plans. 
 3c. We suggest HC/RHA partners should attempt to 
routinely use those agreed upon communication 
vehicles when working together. 
 3d. We suggest all agreed upon communication 
vehicles should be tested on a scheduled basis, with 
objective criteria to validate the test. 
 3e. We suggest the choice of communication vehicles 
and testing may be based on likely disaster/pandemic 
events (Hazard Vulnerability Analyses), and/or other 
appropriate considerations. 
 3f. We suggest developing defi ned disaster/pandemic 
plans for monitoring and leveraging popular social 
media (eg, Twitter, Facebook, others) during all actual 
or potential surge events, or unusual or large scale 
planned or unplanned events requiring cooperation, 
as both a means for gathering and transmitting 
information, as appropriate. 
 3g. We suggest HC/RHAs should have defi ned 
communication tools designated for each level of 
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organizational leadership, which should be consistent 
with ICS structure or equivalent. 
 HC/RHAs are the most important source of accurate, 
real-time data, with hospitals being the primary interface 
with patients, the community, and government agencies.  1 , 4  
They are the information clearinghouses on locations 
and levels of supplies, medications, beds, personnel, 
and virtually all resources necessary to coordinate 
an eff ective mass critical care disaster response and 
interface with the media and public ( Fig 2 ).  1 , 4 , 26 , 27  
 Limited information describes how HC/RHA commu-
nication systems might function,  26 , 27  but we suggest on 
the use of uniform shared communication systems of 
varying sophistication. Regardless of which communica-
tion modalities are selected, redundancy is important, 
and back-up systems should always be tested and readily 
available. Emergency contact information should be 
easily and quickly accessible, with multiple ways of 
fi nding personnel. Web-based or network-centric com-
puter information systems are powerful options, given 
the volume of information encountered in any disaster 
and the urgent need to access and assimilate it by partners 
and government at all levels.  3 , 28 , 29  Additionally, telemedi-
cine technology may be used to improve situational 
awareness, assist in fi eld triage, and augment local medical 
surge capacity by providing specialty expertise immedi-
ately to the scene of an event.  30  
 Partners should test technologies and processes to verify 
that they function as planned. We suggest this be done 
yearly at minimum but strongly encourage partners to 
use them at every opportunity, from planned large-scale 
events and moderate surge events to disasters. Although 
research on emergency network communication is 
proposed, no defi ned standards exist.  31  Individually 
developed metrics should focus on the choice of 
communication vehicles and their accessibility within 
appropriate time frames under disaster-like 
circumstances. 
 Social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, are a 
powerful way to disseminate information at a stunningly 
rapid pace during disasters.  32  Th is technology is an 
important new communication tool, and we suggest 
HC/RHAs consult with social media experts or soft ware 
companies in developing strategies to use them. 
 System-Level Surge Capacity and Capability 
 4a. We suggest HC/RHA surge objectives should be 
consistent with individual hospital surge goals and 
include the capability to surge to: 
 •  Up to 200% above routine maximal capacity based 
on the nature and severity of the disaster (contin-
gency to crisis) 
 •  Up to the limit of the total number of ventilators 
available to coalition partners. 
 •  Up to projected patient loads in a slow onset, slow 
evolving disaster. 
 4b. We suggest HC/RHAs should be able to monitor 
and track their defi ned surge capacity supplies and 
equipment, ideally “real time” and electronically, with 
the intent of being able to use all HC/RHA assets. 
Th ese supplies and equipment may include identifi ed 
caches of important medications or equipment, and 
bed availability among partners. 
 4c. We suggest HC/RHAs should have the ability to 
track the number of available ICU capable personnel 
(“force multipliers”) and other designated specialist 
“resources” (eg, pediatric and special populations) 
through their partner hospitals. Partners with 
telemedicine capability (such as tele-ICU’s) should 
have plans for how to use this resource to optimize the 
use of pediatric and specialty expertise across hospi-
tals served by the telemedicine resource. 
 4d. We suggest HC/RHAs should have defi ned policies 
and procedures for emergency privileging for all 
health-care professionals designated as coalition 
resources. 
 4e. We suggest fair and adequate reimbursement for 
expenditures and loss of revenue related to delivery of 
acute critical care services during a disaster or 
  
 Figure 2 –  Summary of suggestions for health-care coalition/regional 
health authority leadership regarding communication. 
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pandemic must be ensured. Th is should include the 
guarantee of payments from governmental sources, as 
well as by insurance companies and other payers of 
health-care services. 
 In responding to any disaster or pandemic, the task 
force strongly believes HC/RHAs will be most prepared 
if they have quantitative knowledge of where resources 
are available to facilitate access, mobilization, and eff ective 
use ( Fig 3 ). Th ese resources include beds, equipment, 
supplies, and personnel. Suggested system-level surge 
goals are the same as for individual hospitals and range 
from conventional (20% above capacity) to contingency 
(up to 100% above capacity), to crisis surge levels (up to 
200% above capacity) (see “Surge Capacity Principles” 
and “Surge Capacity Logistics” articles by Hick et al  23  and 
Einav et al,  24  respectively, in this consensus statement).  33  
Most hospitals and regions have limited reserve bed 
capacity under routine circumstances, with only 
25% maximum number of open beds, which equates to 
500 beds per million population.  34 - 36  Pediatric beds are 
scarcer, or may be geographically or otherwise unavail-
able, with altered standards of care likely needed to 
accommodate even a moderate disaster surge.  10 , 36 - 38  
 Given these considerations, the task force strongly 
believed it important for HC/RHA leadership to have 
knowledge of all partner hospitals’ actual and potential 
bed availability, to be considered as surge capacity. Th is 
engagement should occur at the earliest opportunity, 
especially if there are, or are likely to be, a high number 
of resource-intense pediatric or specialty care casualties 
(eg, burns, and so forth) to provide extensive resources 
quickly, redirect transfers, and provide for the greatest 
possible breadth of care. 
 In planning transfer of critically ill patients, ED-housed 
patients may be at less risk than those already admitted, 
but at increasing risk the longer they reside in an ED.  39 , 40  
Patients with high acuity, such as those who are 
mechanically ventilated, may benefi t from transfers to 
tertiary care centers, but specifi c ICU type (eg, medical 
ICU, cardiac care unit) is less likely to impact care.  41 - 43  
Coordination of patient transfer to facilities with 
preidentifi ed centers of excellence in critical care is an 
opportunity to improve patient outcomes further.  44 , 45  
Critically ill patients not (immediately) triaged to critical 
care, typically based on various exclusion criteria (see 
“Triage” article by Christian et al  46  in this consensus 
statement  46  ), are at increased risk of death.  47  
 Surge capacity is limited by the need for one ventilator 
per mass critical care patient. A recent inventory 
determined that US hospitals own a supply of 62,188 
full-feature ventilators and 98,738 less-advanced 
ventilators (total, 160,926)  48  to serve 93,955 ICU beds.  49  
Th us, insuffi  cient ventilators are available to even double 
usual ICU capability in a national public health emer-
gency without access to regional or national stockpiles. 
Despite the limitation in ventilator supply and the high 
occupancy of existing ICU beds, only 29% of average 
US hospital ICU beds are occupied with a patient on a 
ventilator.  50  Other systems, such as county (state-run) 
hospitals in the United States, Canada, and Europe, 
routinely run at near 100% capacity with ventilated 
patients. Th us, the ability of existing critical care services 
to accommodate substantial mass critical care surges 
varies widely and can only be established by knowing 
ventilator capacity and their location. 
 We suggest mass critical care local operational planning 
include an inventory of the number of ventilators, 
including full-feature ventilators, specialized ventilators 
for newborns, and less-advanced ventilators with limited 
versatility that nonetheless can be lifesaving in patients 
with respiratory failure. Suggestions regarding the types 
and number of medications, critical care supplies, and 
equipment are found elsewhere in this supplement (see 
“Surge Capacity Logistics” article by Einav et al  24  in this 
consensus statement).  51  Beds, ventilators, medications, 
supplies, and equipment should be tracked electronically 
by HC/RHAs, with knowledge of both their absolute 
numbers and whereabouts immediately available to 
system leaders. 
 Potential critical care surge personnel (force multipliers) 
should be identifi ed with current contact information 
(see “Surge Capacity Logistics” article by Einav et al  24  in 
this consensus statement). Given the foreseeable shortage 
  
 Figure 3 –  Summary of suggestions for health-care coalition/regional 
health authority leadership regarding the number and location of surge 
resources, and important surge priorities. 
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of intensivists, hospitalists may be the likely group to 
augment intensive care staffi  ng, although any hospital-
based provider may be recruited.  52 , 53  Training and 
just-in-time education for these health-care profes-
sionals must be planned so as to provide critical care in 
an emergency. 
 Some precedent and support for credentialing health-
care professional volunteers in a major disaster exist 
(See “Legal Preparedness” article by Courtney et al  13  in 
this consensus statement).  54 , 55  To the degree possible 
under local law, a mechanism for emergency credential-
ing of health-care professional volunteers should exist, 
which may even include HC/RHA partners simply 
recognizing credentialing processes of other health-
care organizations to benefi t from each other’s profes-
sional pools. 
 Pediatric Patients and Specialty Populations 
 5a. We suggest HC/RHA have identifi ed, and be familiar 
with, the following pediatric disaster/pan demic 
designated resources including, but not limited to: 
 •  Pediatric consultative specialists available by dedi-
cated phone line support and/or dedicated video or 
telemedicine consultation. 
 •  Designated pediatric surge personnel (eg, pediatric 
hospitalists, others) available to non-pediatric hos-
pitals and health systems to support surge in con-
tingency or crisis level events, with a defi ned plan 
for how to activate this resource when needed. 
 •  Identifi ed pediatric capable transport resources for 
allocation and matching of pediatric patients to 
available HC/RHA pediatric resources. 
 •  Knowledge of available key supplies, medications, 
and other pediatric assets; location of these assets 
with a defi ned process for how they may be accessed 
urgently; and ability to monitor when asset reserves 
fall below a defi ned critical threshold. 
 •  Pediatric educational resources. If web-based, they 
should be found on HC/RHA websites, or with links 
to appropriate resources. If published, resources 
should be readily available to all partners. 
 5b. We suggest HC/RHAs should have plans to 
provide care for specialty populations routinely found 
in their catchment area or region in parallel as 
described for pediatrics. Resources should include 
consultative services, potential surge personnel, 
transport resources, specialty supplies/medications, 
and educational resources. Th ese populations include 
but are not limited to trauma, nephrology, burns, 
oncologic patients. 
 5c. Health-care coalitions, health systems, and 
hospitals identify patients with high-level chronic 
disease care needs, such as a home ventilator, home 
oxygen, chronic dialysis, and work to ensure their 
needs are met at home to help prevent these patients 
from having to seek assistance at hospitals. 
 Pediatric hospitals provide superior care for severe 
pediatric trauma,  56 , 57  as well as for critically ill chil-
dren  58 - 60  and neonates,  61 , 62  with better outcomes than 
nonpediatric facilities. Most children ( . 90%) are cared 
for in nonpediatric EDs, and one-half of these depart-
ments see  , 10 children each day.  63  Fewer than 20% of 
hospital beds are intended for the care of children, and 
these are clustered at a minority of hospitals.  36  Pediatric 
critical care beds account for  , 10% of all ICU beds in 
the United States and are clustered at an even smaller 
number of hospitals.  49 , 64  As a result, professional 
organizations have long recommended that pediatric 
emergency and critical care resources be regionalized so 
that resuscitation and stabilization are available close to 
every community; common low-risk conditions are 
treated at community hospitals, and high-risk complex 
conditions are transferred to pediatric hospitals .  65  
 Children account for 25% of the population in the 
United States. It is plausible that in public health 
emergencies, pediatric surges will exceed age-specifi c 
resources even if pediatric patients are proportional to 
their numbers in the general population. Th e Pediatric 
Emergency Mass Critical Care Task Force  66  recently 
endorsed CHEST’s mass critical care framework,  67  and 
we continue to recommend that pediatric-specifi c 
disaster planning is essential. However, to accommodate 
surges of children, pediatric disaster/pandemic services 
must be well integrated into regional systems of care.  66 - 68  
In a disaster or pandemic, pediatric care is usual care, 
not specialty care. All HC/RHAs must be prepared to 
provide care for large numbers of pediatric patients 
across their region, and operational plans must account 
for unique local circumstances ( Fig 4 ).  10  Pediatric 
consultants should be available to all regional part-
ners by phone or telemedicine for remote consulta-
tion. Potential benefi ts of telemedicine communications 
include improved situational awareness, assistance in 
field triage, and timely expert consultation.  30  Telemedi-
cine communications may be vulnerable to damage in 
some disasters.  69  
 Nonpediatric hospitals must survey and identify staff  
with pediatric capability, organize contact information, 
and develop job assignments for them. All members of 
the hospital team who will provide care to children will 
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benefi t from drills and education as well as from 
just-in-time education tailored to the circumstances of 
the emergency. Internet resources may be invaluable to 
support just-in-time education, but electronic access 
may be unreliable during emergencies, so consideration 
should be given for printed educational resources. 
 Interhospital transport resources may also be limited in 
pandemics and disasters. Decision makers must evaluate 
the merits of sending critical care staff , supplies, and 
equipment from uninvolved remote sites to a localized 
disaster vs transporting the patients from nonpediatric 
hospitals to a pediatric center. Priorities must be 
determined for those who should be transferred fi rst 
(one-on-one transport staffi  ng for the most severely ill 
patients may exhaust limited critical care resources). In a 
disaster or pandemic, optimizing population outcomes 
may require transport strategies distinct from those used 
in ordinary circumstances, adapting to event-specifi c 
local needs and resources (see “Evacuation of the ICU” 
article by King et al  25  in this consensus statement). 
 Supplies and medications unique to pediatric popula-
tions may rapidly be depleted in a large disaster, and the 
regions’ hospitals should have knowledge and access to 
these resources at other sites. Th e levels of supplies should 
ideally be monitored, as described in the surge article 
(see “Surge Capacity Logistics” article by Einav et al  24  in 
this consensus statement). 
 New pediatric-specifi c evidence may illustrate approaches 
that also pertain to integrating care of other vulnerable 
populations into regional systems. HC/RHAs should 
define their local vulnerable populations, optimally 
with plans to meet their needs at home rather than 
in a hospital (see “Special Populations” article by 
  
 Figure 4 –  Summary of suggestions for health-care coalition/regional 
health authority leadership regarding pediatric resources (which may 
also be used for special populations). 
Dries et al  70  in this consensus statement). Th e task force 
suggests that planning for these vulnerable populations 
should also mirror the approach described above for 
pediatric patients. 
 HC/RHAs and Networks 
 6a. We suggest during a disaster requiring transfer of 
patients, whether from emergency medicine depart-
ments or inpatient areas, transferring partners may 
have initial choice of where patients are referred based 
on traditional referral patterns. However, HC/RHA 
leadership must oversee this process, and be able to 
intercede as both a resource and with the authority to 
redirect transfers based on anticipated or actual 
events. Defi ned health-care coalition coordination 
processes and transfer resources should be planned 
and identifi ed ahead of time. 
 6b. Health-care coalitions should designate neigh-
boring health-care coalitions as potential partners 
during a contingency or crisis event, and have 
readily available leadership contact information, 
and knowledge of these potential partners’ size and 
capabilities. 
 Hospitals commonly transfer and receive patients along 
an informal yet structured network based on availability 
of services, with more-resourced hospitals tending to 
receive more referrals.  44 , 45  Approximately 4.5% of 
Medicare patients admitted to an ICU ultimately 
undergo an interhospital critical care transfer.  45  If a 
major referral hospital was incapacitated, accepting 
transfers would halt, and transfer of its own patients 
would likely be devastating to usual referral networks.  45  
During a major disaster or pandemic, HC/RHA 
leadership needs to access knowledge of all regional ICU 
and hospital beds quickly, as discussed previously. 
 Th e movement of patients, whether to evacuate a 
hospital or to decompress a facility to increase acute care 
capacity, will be enhanced by a regionalized, coordi-
nated, and accountable emergency care system.  19 , 71  
Neighboring HC/RHA partners are also crucial allies for 
accepting potential patient transfers; hence, the task 
force has suggested that all HC/RHAs be familiar with 
their neighboring coalitions’ leadership, capacity, and 
organizational capabilities. 
 Models of Advanced Regional Care Systems 
 7. Advanced Regional Care Systems instituted within 
large hospitals, and across hospitals, health systems 
and HC/RHAs, will have the greatest chance for 
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success if they are established with the following 
goals: 
 •  Clear and transparent objectives for what those 
programs are to accomplish, and the programs are 
well integrated and accepted across their hospital 
and health system partners. 
 •  Have administrative and fi nancial resources suffi  -
cient to support the objectives desired 
 •  Are evaluated based on objective outcome measures 
and best-practice process indicators, and strive for 
consistent data defi nitions and goals, which facilitate 
outcome comparison with other systems. 
 •  Are driven by an impassioned performance improve-
ment culture. 
 •  Have eff ective communication systems and processes 
across their hospitals, health systems, and HC/RHA 
partners, between potential pre- and post- hospital 
partners, and with patients and families. 
 •  Develop clear expectations and supportive clinical 
and educational resources for patients and their 
families, especially those patients with chronic 
medical illnesses. 
 Advanced regional care systems may be defi ned as large 
clinical programs that function across hospitals, health 
systems, and/or regions and are characterized by 
established program objectives and performance 
expectations ( Fig 5 , e-Table 1 ). Successful examples 
include trauma systems, recognized as the standard for 
best care to injured patients  72  ; telemedicine ICU 
programs, now numbering  . 300 programs in the 
United States and providing high-quality ICU care for 
up to 8% of nongovernment ICU beds  73  ; and the Renal 
Disaster Relief Task Force, with a proven history of 
providing urgent dialysis to disaster victims (usually 
aft er earthquakes) in less-developed countries  74 , 75  (see 
 e - Appendix  1 for further discussion of these examples). 
 Successful foundations of these programs may be viewed 
as a fi ve-level pyramid ( Fig 5 ), with the foundation being 
strong leadership in establishing and planning the vision 
of the program and securing the necessary fi nancial and 
political resources.  17 , 20 , 74 - 77  Successive levels include the 
culture that drives the clinical systems of care; the 
clinical data and outcomes used for quality assessment 
and continuous improvement; and, fi nally, technology, 
which is driven primarily by program objectives.  30 , 76 , 78  
Quality of patient care is at the top of the pyramid, with 
mortality data currently the best objective care measure 
(e-Table 1), with functional outcomes as a high priority, 
and with patient and family experience being increas-
ingly important.  72 , 75 , 79 - 84  (Please see  e - Appendix  1 for 
further discussion of advanced regional care systems in 
relation to trauma networks, telemedicine ICU programs, 
and the Renal Disaster Relief Task Force.) 
 The Use of Simulation for Preparedness and 
Planning 
 8. We suggest hospitals, health systems, and HC/RHAs 
promote the use of computer modeling to gain insight 
into their operational capabilities and limitations, in 
the following ways: 
 •  Support the creation of computer models utilizing 
industry templates in collaboration with their own 
administrative, clinical, and technical resource 
experts from participating system partners. Models 
should include government and military resources 
when applicable, and include provision of mainte-
nance of chronically ill patient populations. 
 •  Collaborate with modelers in the design, imple-
mentation, and testing of these models; and with 
the interpretation and application of these results. 
 •  Support the data requirements for such system 
models, and develop repositories for operationally 
relevant data that can be used in future modeling 
eff orts. 
 •  Leverage their relationships with national, regional, 
and local governments and public health agencies 
and emergency medical service providers to obtain 
necessary data on the transportation and patient 
logistic components of such models as required. 
 Computer-based modeling is a widely used and pow-
erful tool that helps complex organizations understand 
their own processes, resources, and capacity in the face 
of variability in demand and/or supply of services and 
  
 Figure 5 –  Pyramid illustrating levels of priorities for successful advanced 
regional care systems. 
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materiel.  85  Mathematical and simulation models have 
been used to optimize well-defi ned processes, such as 
the allocation and movement of prehospital transporta-
tion resources,  86 - 88  forecast bed demand and critical 
resources given normal and exceptional use patterns,  89 , 90  
and represent health-care resources from the indi-
vidual facility  91  to a national scale.  92  Health-system 
models may use a variety of methods, ranging from 
queuing theory,  93  linear programming,  86  and spread-
sheet modeling  94  to a variety of computational tech-
niques including Monte Carlo,  91  discrete-event,  89  and 
agent-based simulation.  95  
 Computer modeling provides benefi ts for health-system 
planning and integration. First, eff orts to create in silico 
models of current or planned systems require prelimi-
nary interactions among key participants to defi ne 
capabilities and requirements.  96  Quantifying current use 
and resource requirements may help in preparation for 
surge requirements during disasters/pandemics and 
provide the rationale for future collaboration and 
resource-sharing arrangements. Once calibrated, models 
may be used to explore an evidence-based, system-wide 
approach to health-system planning and response at 
both the prehospital and hospital-based levels without 
causing disruption to current activities.  87 , 88  
 While “off -the-shelf ” modeling platforms are available, 
the following two-step approach for developing simula-
tions is suggested: (1) Health-care leaders should fi rst 
specify the operational questions to be answered. For 
example, Levi and colleagues  92  (see later) created their 
model to answer the question of whether bed number 
was a good marker for operative capability. (2) Once the 
scope and purpose are clear, health-care leaders may 
consider reaching out to regional engineering schools, 
which typically have experience in developing policy-
relevant and technically sophisticated simulation with 
models of complex real-world processes. 
 An example illustrating both the potential benefi ts and 
limits of using modeling for planning mass casualty 
care is the pioneering study of Levi et al,  92  in which they 
developed a novel simulation model of Israeli trauma 
management to assess how well hospitals’ stated bed 
capacity correlates with projected operative capability 
under high-volume scenarios. Th is exercise required 
extensive data collection, including historical review of 
injury number and type (eg, orthopedic, neurologic) 
and also extensive and detailed information about actual 
hospital size, bed number, staffi  ng (anesthesiologists and 
surgeons), and use across the country. Two strategies for 
load reduction at major trauma centers were tested: 
alternating day admissions and triage of less severe cases 
to outlying hospitals. Th e unexpected fi nding was that 
uniform policies did not always lead to improvement in 
operative capability and that the gains that did occur 
were not always proportional to hospital size during the 
emergency scenario. Th e health-system-level insights 
gained through this modeling exercise would have 
been diffi  cult to ascertain otherwise except in the setting 
of an actual national disaster. Additionally, access to 
high-quality, realistic hospital-level data helped create 
this policy-relevant model. 
 Conclusions 
 Th e Task Force provides an enhanced framework for 
HC/RHA leaders to optimize teamwork and eff ective 
planning in pandemics and disasters. We suggest 
focusing on including joint communication tools and 
processes; identifi cation and sharing surge resources, 
including location, quantity, and how to access them 
quickly; planning for pediatric populations as usual (not 
special) care; and understanding internal transfer 
networks to optimize potential transfers both within 
their region and to neighboring HC/RHAs. Task force 
members strongly believe that critical care specialists 
should be represented in HC/RHA leadership and be 
actively involved in all disaster/pandemic planning for 
large numbers of potential critically ill patients. Th e Task 
Force also promotes modeling of advanced regional care 
systems and simulation to provide insight into the 
development of future processes. 
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